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CAUSATION AND MEMORY 
by 
David Pears 
What causal conditions have to be fulfilled in a case of remembering? The best 
strategy for answering this question is to concentrate on experience-memory. In 
a case of experience-memory, the subject makes a correct claim to remember 
having a certain experie�ce in the past. It is in such cases that the role or causa­
tion in memory is revealed most clearly. For an experience-memory claim ties 
down the beginning of the causal chain that produced. it to a single definite event·, 
the actual occurrence of the experience. So if the causal chain in fact began with 
some other event, which occurred between t.�e experience and the claim, the 
memory would not be an experience-memory, and the claim would be, to that 
extent, incorrect. 
This can be illustrated with an example adapted from Martin's and Deutscher's 
article "Remembering." 1 If a child had an experience at the age of 3, and at the 
age of 4 irrevocably forgot having it and that he had it, and at the age of 5 heard 
his mother describe it to him in detail, than any subsequent memory of it that he 
might have could not be an expf!rience-memory. For the causation of the mem­
ory-impression within bis mind would go back only to his hearing his mother's ac­
count of the experience. Even if his memory seemed to him to be an experience­
memory, it could only be the memory that he had the experience. 
On the face of it this is straightforward. But it conceals a problem, because it 
is not entirely clear what marks off experience-memory from other types of 
memory. We may not even have a special form of words reserved for experience­
memory c1aims. No doubt, if I said that I remembered seeing a particular horse 
win the Derby in 1959, this would be taken as an experience-memory claim. But 
I might not have meant it in that way. For the phrase "seeing the horse win the 
Derby" might be a gerundial form of the substantival clause " that I saw the horse 
win the Derby", just as "I remember his leaving the room" might be another way 
of saying, "I remember that he left the room." 
If there is the same ambiguity in "I remember seeing him leave the room", 
there is no special form of words reserved for experience-memory claims. 
This would not matter very much, because the verb "remember" is nearly al­
ways meant to have an especially close connection with the gerund in such sen­
tences as "I remember seeing the horse win the Derby." If there are cases in which 
such claims are not meant as experience-memory claims, they are certainly rare, 
and presumably signalled by something in the context. But there is a more serious 
underlying problem. What distinguishes the case in which I do remember the 
actual seeing from the case in which I only remember that I saw the horse win? 
It is clear that, if I remember the seeing, it must cause my memory-impression 
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directly, whatever that means. But we cannot convert this proposition. For sup· 
pose that I confined myself to making the weaker memory-claim that the horse 
won the Derby. Suppose too that this fact had been fed into my mind only once, 
and that was at the race through my actually seeing the horse win, so that the case 
was not like that of the mother and child. It still does not follow that my memory 
was really an experience-memory, and that I was, therefore, in a position to 
make the stronger claim. For the satisfaction of the requirement of direct causa­
tion is not a sufficient condition, but only a necessary condition of experience­
memory. 
Something more is needed, but, though the extra requirement evidently must 
be concerned with the phenomenal properties of experience-memories, it is not 
easy to formulate it precisely. It might be thought that there must be relevant im­
ages in all cases of experience-memory, and that, when this is added to the re­
quirement of direct causation, the result really is a sufficient condition. But im­
agery cannot be necessary, because some people do not get images even when 
their original experience was visual, and we can hardly say that such people never 
remember seeing things. Perhaps it would be better to make a more general stip­
ulation that in experience-memory, the subject must relive the experience in one 
way or another. But what counts as reliving it? Certainly it is not enough that I 
should be able to recall additional details over and above the mere fact that the 
horsewon the race. For my memory that it won might be expandible in this way. 
Nor is the ability to produce additional details necessary for experience-memory. 
For it must be possible to haye an unexpandible experience-memory, even if it 
very seldom happens. So perhaps this rather vague concept cannot be character­
ized any more precisely than this: a subject has an experience-memory if and on­
ly if he relives the experience in the most vivid kind of way that is within his gen­
eral competence and this reli.ving is directly caused by the experience itself. 'This 
allows the appropriately vivid type of rehearsal to vary from person to person. It 
also allows for the possibility of marginal experience-memory claims, such as, "I 
can just remember seeing the horse win." This would mean that, though I could 
relive the experience in the most vivid kind of way that was within my general 
competence--e.g. in images-my images were very sketchy or indeterminate. 
If this is right, the borderline between experience-memory and other kinds of 
memory will not always be firm and clear. In doubtful cases, the causation may 
incline us to say that it must be an experience-memory, because it was directly 
caused by the experience itself, but the lack of vividness of the memory-impres­
sion may incline us to the opposite view. There is a similar conflict in a case de­
scribed by C.J. Radford in "Knowledge by Examples. "2 A schoolboy is asked an 
historical date, such as the date of the Battle of Hastings, and he gets it right, but 
he feels no confidence in his answer and does not even claim to remember the 
date. But his teacher tells him that he does remember it, because he got it right 
and the information was fed into his mind only the day before. Of course, in this 
case the issue is not whether a memory is an experience-memory, but whether 
something is any kind of memory. But there is a similar conflict between the 
causation and the phenomenal features. . 
If we use cases or �xpe.rience-memoey in an inquiry into the connection be-
tween memory and causation, it may be thought that the narrow focus will lead 
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to a loss of generality in the results. But this is not really so. For though the task 
of distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate causation is less manage-. 
able in cases of factual memory, it is essentially the same task. The difficulty 
comes only from the greater variety of admissible input-events. For example, if 
a neural surgeon could imprint onto a schoolboy's brain the impression that the 
Battle of Hastings was fought in 1066, that would be an impression of factual 
memory, just like the impression that woulcl have been produced by the more usual 
kind of history lesson. But this only forces us to generalize over different kinds 
of appropriate input-event, and, when that has been done, the requirement of 
appropriate causation will take the same form. The stipulation that the causation 
must be appropriate means, roughly, that there must be continuous storage of a 
certain kind. I have not yet tried to specify the right kind of storage, but there 
is no reason to expect any difference between the storage appropriate to exper­
ience-memory and the storage appropriate to f41ctual memory. So the results 
reached in the investigation of experience-memory may be generalized to other 
kinds of memory, and we can take advantage of the greater manageability of ex­
perience-memory without any loss of generality. 
The haziness of the borderline between experience-memory and factual mem­
ory is a real difficulty. I shall deal with it by keeping as far as possible from the 
borderline and choosing examples in which the phenomena) features are obvious­
ly appropriate for experience-memory and asking whether the causation is ap­
propriate too. At least, that will be my primary procedure. In certain cases I shall 
have to adopt a different, seconda,ry procedure, to be explained in a moment. 
First, I should point out that my primary procedure differs from the proce­
dure followed by Martin and Deutscher in their article. 3 What they profess to be 
investigating is not remembering having an experience but remembering an event. 
Nevertheless, what they say about remembering an event is very like what I have 
been saying about remembering having an experience. This is because they always 
choose examples of events which were in fact experienced by the person who 
claims to remember them. 
Hut this procedure is misleading because it does not use the method of iden­
tifying cases that it purports to be using. It purports to be identifying them as 
cases of event-memory. But there are cases in which a person can correctly claim 
to remember an event that occurred in his lifetime, even though he did not wit­
ness it. For example, many people remember John Kennedy's assassination in 
that way. If we wish to exclude such cases, we should stipulate that the claim is 
to remember witnessing the event, which is stronger than the claim to remember 
it. 
Martin and Deutsche� can meet this criticism by pointing out that it is legiti­
mate to broaden the concept of "experiencing" to include more than "witness­
ipg.,, But . though this is a possible line to take, it is not a sufficient defence of 
their procedure. For there are also cases of remembering events which do not 
even fall under the broader concept of "experiencing." For example, two school­
boys are running through the date of decisive battles in English history, and one 
of them says, "I've forgotten the one that comes after the Battle of Hastings", 
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and the other says, "I remember it: it is .... " It follows that the claim to remem­
ber 8:ll event does not imply any claim to remember experiencing it even in the 
broader sense. 
So wherever po_ssible I shall choose examples in which someone. makes an ex­
perience-memory claim. because that is how his mem9ry strikes him, and, for the 
sake of simplicity, I shall interpret "experiencing" as "witnessing." That will be 
my primary procedure, and it differs from that of Martin and Deutscher. 
However, it will not always be possible to use examples of this type, because 
there are occasiops on which a person would be unlikely to make a sincere exper­
ience-memory claim _if his memory was inappropriately caused. In such cases I 
shall follow a secondary procedure which is more like that of Martin and 
Deutscher. I shall inquire whethei: the memory in fact meets the causal require­
ments. of experience-memory without assuming that it strikes the subject as an 
experience-memory or that he makes such a claim. 
The most important feature of experience-memory is an obvious one. It comes 
by a causal route which is not inspecta.ble . .All that the subject can do if he wants 
to check tJle persistence of the causation is to ask himself whether he still remem­
bers having the experience. People sometimes do this repe.atedly when 
they are afraid of forgetting something. The mechanism which maintains the dis· 
position to make correct claims remains inscrutable. 
There is at this point a certain analogy between experience-memory and per· 
ception. In both cases the impressions come unheralded be�ause their causation 
is not inspectable, and yet they are not produced by our own basic actions, as 
some thoughts are. Hume4 and Russel16 exaggerated this analogy. There is, per­
haps, a closer one between experience-memory and a desire that lasts for a long 
time. For such a desire is :also dispositional, unlike a perception, and the persis· 
tance of the causation that maintains it can be checked only by intermittent 
soundings. The subject has to ask him�lf whether he still wants what he originally 
want�d. In fact,. it looks as if any reasons that there may be for postulating mem­
ory-traces would also be reasons for postulating desire-traces. 'The main difference 
would lie in the direction of fit: a memory-trace has to fit the earlier experience, 
but a desire-trace is not required to fit anything-rather, the future achievement 
ought to fit it. 
Whatever the closest analogy may be, it is clear that the internal causation of 
experience-memory claims is not inspectable. If we want tof ind in this field a 
contrasting case of internal causation that is inspectable, the best example is 
associational thinking, a{ld it may be that. reasoning is another example. 
The nonnal causal route of experience-memory is wholly internal, unlike that 
of perception, which is partly internal and partly external. But deviations some­
times follow external loQps. Most of the cases of deviation discussed by Martin 
and Deutscher are of this kind. One example (an adaptation of one of theirs) will 
suffice. A policeman, X, is involved in a car chase. He sees a man in the car that 
he is pursuing shoot the driver of his own car dead. His memory of seeing the 
shooting lasts for the thirty seconds that elapse before the crash in which he is 
concussed and forgets everything that happened in the preceding minute. How­
ever, there is a second policeman, Y, who is sitting in the back of the car, and, 
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though Y fails to see the shooting, he does hear X describing it over the_ radio 
while it is going on. Y escapes injury in the crash, and he visits X in the hospital 
after he has recovered consciousness and tells X's story back to him. The next 
day X finds that his memory that the shooting occurred exactly as Y described it 
turns into something phenomenally indistinguishable from an experience-memory. 
But Y doubts whether it really is an experience-memory, because he suspects that 
the causation may have f9llowed the external loop. If so, the case would be like 
that of the mother and child except that Y knows what X experienced only 
through X's contemporary report. 
It may be felt that it is very unlikely that X would appropriate Y's story as an 
experience-memory of his own. Children do this, it may be said, but not police­
men. But adults do sometimes transform hearsay memories into apparent exper­
ience-memories, and, in any case, if anyone doubts this, I can adopt my secondary 
procedure ; I can change the example by supposing that after hearing Y's story, X 
claims to remember only that the shooting occurred in the way described by Y, 
basing _ his claim on hearsay, because he also remembers that Y was his source . 
Then the argument would be that the causation on this route is inappropriate to 
experience-memory, so that X's memory could not have been an experience­
memory even if it had had the right phenomenal features and X had forgotten its 
real source. 
We also need an example involving an internal loop. A is travelling in Italy 
with B and he is learning the language. B tells him the meaning of an uncommon 
Italian word, and after the holiday, though he remembers the meaning of the 
word, he cannot remember being told it by B. In fact he has no idea how he 
learned it, as often happens with' a fon:ign language. However, months later he 
has what seems to b� a memory of being told the meaning of the word by B. 
But then he reflects that there is a striking similarity between the sound of the 
word and the sound of B's name. So even when B assures him that he did not tell 
him the meaning of the word, he still wonders whether his memory really is an 
experience-memory. He suspects that the causation may have gone through the 
sound association, in which case it would not be appropriate to experience-mem­
ory. If his suspicion is justified, this will be an example of a deviation following 
an internal loop. 
'Ihis case may raise the same doubt as the previous one, but this tim� it will 
be more difficult to settle. It is not too difficult to establish that a person who 
did not have experience E may hear someone else, who did have it, recalling it, 
and so may acquire an apparent experience-memory which, unlike X's, is radic­
ally mistaken,· because he did not have E. In such a case there would be little 
doubt that the causation went through the other person 's story. But internal 
loops are more inscrutable. For, though it would be easy to get a case in which 
A's apparent experience-memory was radically mistaken, because B never told 
him the meaning of the word, it would J;>e much less easy to establish that the 
causation went through the sound associa�ion, 
But these are cases of radical mistake. If there is no radical mistake, the ques­
tion about evidence is more difficult. Granted that apparent experience-memories 
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which are not radically mistaken a� in general possible, how can anyone discover 
the causal route and s9 find out whether a particular memory belongs to this 
class? Anyone who refused to grant that they are in general possible will have to 
reformulate the question in line with my secondary procedure� and ask how any­
one can find out whether the causal route would or would not have indicated ex­
perience-mem�ry, if the memory had had the right phenomenal features. 
But the question about evidence is not the only one i:rused by these examples. 
There is also the question, how many different hypotheses we can formulate 
about the causation of the memory in this kind or case, and the question, which 
of these hypotheses, if established, would lead us to classify the memory as an ex­
perience-memory, and which of them would lead us to reject that classification. 
Most of what follows will be concerned with the formulation of the various 
hypotheses and with their impact on the classification of the memory, rather 
than with relating them to the available evidence. 




The causation of the memory-impression is operative on a single route, 
which is either the normal one or a deviation. 
The causation is operative both on the normal route and on a deviation, 
and on each of the two its operation is both independent of its opera­
tion on the other and sufficient to produce the memory-impression with­
out the help of the causation on the other. 
C. The causation is operative on both the normal route and on a deviation, 
but, though its operation on each of the two is i�dependent of its oper· 
ation on the other, it is not sufficient by itself to produce the memory 
impression, but only jointly with the causation on the other. 
D. The causation is operative both on the normal route and on a deviation, 
but its operation on each of the two is neither independent of its opera­
tion on the other, nor sufficient by itself to produce the memory-im­
pression, but only jointly with the causation on the other. 
It will be noticed that there are four distinctions running through these four 
hypotheses. First, there is the distinction between operative and reserve causa­
tion: reserve causation is not operative, but would have been if the causation 
which was operative had not been. Second, th�re is the distinction between the 
two kinds of causal route, normal and deviant. The third distinction concerns the 
sufficiency of the causation on the two routes: it may be sufficient by itself or 
only jointly. Fourthly, the operation of the causation on each of the two routes 
may or niay not be independent 9f its operation on the other. For example, the 
causation contributed by 11 sensory cue interacts with the normal causation of 
memory an� the causation contributed by a verbal reminder usually interacts 
with it. But all this will become clearer in the detailed discussion of the hypo­
theses. 
A These cases are straightforward. If the operative causation is confined 
to a deviation, the memory cannot be an experience-memory. If it is confined to 
the normal route, the memory may be .an experience-memory, and its phenomenal 
features will determine whether it is one. 
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Here, as in all the cases to be considered under the other hypotheses, the issue 
is decided by what happened, and not by what would have happened, if things 
had gone differently. If there had been independent sufficient causation held in 
reserve on a deviant route, our verdict would have remained unaltered, because 
it is based on the causation that is actually operative. For example, suppose that 
X has an experience-memory caused in the normal way, but that, if he had not 
had it, Y would have given him a phenomenally indistinguishable memory caused 
in a deviant way. In such a case our verdict, that X's memory was an experience. 
memory, would not be upset by our knowledge of the independent, sufficient, 
reserve causation on the deviant route. 
B. The hypothesis is that there is independent sufficient causation opera-
tive both on the normal route and on a deviation. For example, everything hap­
pens as already described in the case of the two policemen, except that on the 
day after X hears Y's story, at the very moment when it is about to produce the 
apparent experience-memory impression, the normal causation revives and so the 
memory impression is caused in two different ways simultaneously. This would 
be like the case of a man killed by two simultaneous bullets in the heart.6 There 
would be no straight answer to the question which of the two routes was followed 
by the causation that produced his memory-impression. It followed both, and the 
effect is shared without being divided between them. So the verdict must be that 
i t  was an experience·memory, whatever else it was. 
'There is a feature of this kind of case which should be emphasized. Y's story 
does not strengthen X's experience-memory by acting as a reminder. If that had 
happened, the two lines of causation would have interacted before they produced 
their shared effect. That would b'e a different kind of case, falling under hypo­
thesis D, which will be discussed later. In B-type cases the two lines remain en­
tirely independent of one another, without �y interaction, all the way to the 
point at which they produce their final effect, like the two bullets. 
This independence of the two causal lines may seem to be an impossibility 
in a B-type case, because it may appear that interaction between the two causal 
lines before they produced their final effect is inevitable. For what could possibly 
stop Y's story acting as a reminder, strengthenin g X's experience-memory? Since 
the same objection is likely to be made about C-type cases, it may be postponed 
until hypothesis C has been formulated in detail. 
C. Thy hypothesis is that there is independent causation operative on both 
routes, but each one is sufficient to produce the memory-impression only joint­
ly with the causation on the other. 
This kind of case is difficult to analyze , but it is an important possibility. In 
the field of perception such cases are less important, because they are unlikely to 
occur. For their occurrence would require the following improbable coincidence: 
there would have tQ be a normal perceptual stiµmlus below the threshold for 
producing a �nse-iippression, and a simultaneous abnormal stimulus, perhaps 
directly applied to the cortex, also below the threshold, and both stimuli would 
have to tend to produce the same type of sense-impression, but, of course, each 
would be only jointly sufficient to produce it. If they did not tend to produce 
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the same type of sense-impression, the result would be a composite, blurred 
sense-impression. But the coincidence is obviously unlikely in ordinary life. If it 
were artificially contrived in an experimental situation, lhe verdict would prob­
ably be that the subject half saw the object. 'This would be a new sense of "half 
seeing" differing from the current one. 
It should be noted that there is another, quite different kind of case in which 
a sense-impression might be caused in two ways which were jointly but not sep­
arately sufficient. An object might be misperceived under the influence of the 
subject's expectation or someone else's suggestion. But in this kind of case, the 
causation on the two routes is nol independent until the production of the shared 
effect. It is only when there is independence all the way to the final point that an 
improbable coincidence is required. 
In the field of memory the requisite coincidence is much less-improbable. For 
memory involves storage and a persistent ability to display what is stored. Con­
sequently, t.he causation which maintains this ability can receive independent 
supplementation at any moment in the usually prolonged period of its existence. 
This yields one contrast with perception, �ecause. there is only a single brief 
moment at which a normal perceptual stimulus can receive independent supple­
mentation from an abnormal source. 
There is also another, more subtle contrast between memory and perception 
in this area. When the normal causation of memory receives supplementation by 
an external loop, the supplementary contribution does not have to be precisely 
on target. This latitude is clearer in cases of reinforcement than in cases of inde­
pendent supplementation. Cues and reminders can act as effective reinforcers, 
reviving the original memories, even if they miss the bull's-eye and only hit t�e 
outer ring. But, of course, cues and ..reminders fall under hypothesis D, because 
the causation on the two routes is not independent, but interacts before the final 
memory-impression is produced. 'Ibey reinforce the normal causation rather than 
supplementing it. However, the same latitude must exist when there is supple­
mentation of the independent kind required by hypothesis C--when, for example, 
Y's story does not act as a reminder, but makes an independent contribution to 
the causation of X's final memory-impression. For this convergence of the two 
causal lines on a single effect will probably be able to occur when the deviant 
causation would have produced a somewhat different effect if it had been oper­
ating on its own. If cues and reminders can exploit this latitude of aim, indepen­
dent causal supplementation must be able to exploit it too. But this is a distinc­
tive feature of memory, not shared by perception. 
'These two contrasts show why the hypothesis of independent joint causation 
needs to be investigated in the case of memory, but is less important in the case 
of perception. 
However, it is a difficult hypothesis to analyze and an example is needed. The 
story about the two policemen may be modified once again to illustrate it. We 
may suppose that the causation appropriate to experience-memory is operating 
in X, but not sufficiently strongly to produce a memory impression. Y's story, 
when be hears it, does not act as a reminder reinforcing his experience-memory. 
Instead, the two causal lines remain independent of one another until the final 
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point at which they jointly produce his memory impression. 'Ibis memory im­
pression has the right phenomenal features for an experience-memory. The ques­
tion is whether we would classify it as one. 
Here, as in the previous B-type case, there is the objection that, if X had a la­
tent memory of seeing the shooting, Y's story would inevitably act as a reminder 
reinforcing it, and so the C-type case would be transformed into a D-type case. 
The discussion of this objection to the description of the B-type case was post­
poned. Can it now be answered? 
First, there can be no doubt that, if the deviant causation involved a sensory 
cue rather than an explicit verbal reminder, interaction between the two causal 
lines would be inevitable. For it is part of the meaning of the phrase 'sensory cue' 
that such a cue must operate in this way. 
But if the deviant causation involves an explicit verbal reminder, the matter is 
not so simple. We call Y's narrative "a reminder" because he intends it to rein­
force X's latent memory, and perhaps elicit further details from him. In order to 
achieve this result, he does not rely on the latitude described just now, but repro­
duces X's own words, spoken into the radio at the time. Evidently, there is no 
improbability in supposing that he fails to reinforce X's latent memory. 'The im­
probability begins when we suppose that, in spite of this, he succeeds in produc­
ing an apparent experience-memory impression in X. But it is a sufficient explan­
ation of his s1Jccess to observe, as I did earlier, that adults do sometimes retain 
the capacity of children to appropriate narratives as apparent experience-mem­
ories. However, that is only the beginning of the improbability of the present ver­
sion of the story. For X's latent experience-memory is now supposed to make at 
the very last moment a causal contribution which together with Y's narrative is 
sufficient to produce a memory impression. This adds to the improbability, be­
cause what Y is offering is a full description of the shooting, and that is the very 
thing that X's latent memory is trying to push through into his consciousness, so 
that it is scarcely credible that the two causal lines will avoid interacting before 
their final cooperation in producing the memory impression 
Here it would be a help if we could appeal to some criterion of being remind-
ed. Expansion of the story, is, of course, a sufficient condition of being reminded, 
but it is not necessary. In its absence, the subject would have to rely on a psycho­
logical criterion: he knows that he is reminded, because he has the characteristic 
experience which is something Jike seeing a light switched on in a half dark room 
--or, to be more precise, when he hears the narrative, he feels that it fits facts 
which, he did not quite remember before he heard it, but does now remember 
partly because of it. 
But unfortunately this criterion is unusable in the present case. For even if 
things happen in the improbable way described, X may still have this character­
istic experience of being reminded. For at the last moment, when the memory 
impression is produced in him, he may feel the fit between it, insofar as it is 
caused in the normal way for experience-memory, and it, insofar as it is caused 
in the deviant way. Of course, he will not necessarily know that this is the ex­
planation of his feeling that there is a fit. But it may, nevertheless, be the explan­
ation, and this possibility makes the usual psychological criterion of being re-
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minded incapable of distinguishing between hypothesis C and hypothesis D. 
If the prdinary, psychological criterion of being reminded is unusable, the dis­
tinction between hypotheses C and D must be a recondite one. This is the object­
or's point. Nevertheless, C:type cases are a marginal possibility, lying within the 
territory of the concept of memory. It is true that they lie in an unmapped part 
of it, because we have no usable criterion of their occurrence. But we do under­
stand the meaning of hypotheses C.  It means that Y's narrative did not reinforce 
the normal causation of X's memory impression but made an independent sup­
plementary contribution to it. 
The same difficulty arises in the other example, which involved an internal de­
viation. 'There, too, A would be unable to use the ordinary psychological criter­
ion of being reminded. He doubts whether his memory impression of being told 
the meaning of the Italian word by B is entirely an experience-memory impres­
sion. He suspects that it may have been jointly caused, by the original experience 
in the normal way and deviantly .by the sound association. But it is no use for 
him to ask himself whether he had any feeling of fit when the memory impres­
sion first occurred. For even if the impression was jointly caused in two different 
ways, he would still have a feeling of fit, just like X in the other example. 
There do�s not seem to be any other psychological criterion available. This is 
a case in which the concepts of unaided memory and reminding lead us to form­
ulate an hypothesis which goes beyond the available psychological evidence. 
Neurology is the only possible source of evidence which would discriminate be­
tween a case in which the two causal lines do not interact before they produce 
their final effect and a case in which they interact at some earlier point. For this 
distinction is c9ncemed with uninspectable causal processes. The fact that we 
cannot yet tie jt down to available evidence in no way discredits it. We certainly 
understand it, and it is. possible that we shall eventually discover neurological cri­
teria which will discriminate between reinforcing a weak memory-trace and com­
pensating for its weakness by adding an independent causal supplement. 
Finally, what is the effect of hypothesis C on the classification of the memory 
impression? In the analogous perceptu� case the verdict was that the subject half 
saw the object. So the verdict in this case must be that it was half an experience­
memory. This is in line with the treatment of A-type and B-type cases. For in 
those two types of case the existence of inappropriate causation, operative or in 
reserve, did not weaken the case for regarding the mem.ory as an experience-mem­
ory, provided that the operative, appropriate causation was sufficient by itself. 
But this proviso is not met in C-type c�ses, and so the memory is only half an ex­
perience-memory, or perhaps some other fraction would fit the case more pre­
cisely. 
D. The hypothesis is that the causation of each of the two lines is sufficient 
to produce the memory impression only jointly with the causation on the other, 
and the inappropriate causation reinforces the appropriate causation before the 
final stage is reached. This is how verbal reminders and sensory cues work. The 
difference between these two kinds of inappropriate .cause is that a verbal re­
minder is a piece of information explicitly offered as an aid to memory, but a 
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The latest version of the incident involving the two policemen will serve as an 
illustration if one more change is made in it: Y's story reinforces X's latent ex­
perience-memory. 'This removes the improbability noted by the objector. 
The general effect of this hypothesis on the classification of the final memory 
is obvious. If it is produced partly by the normal causation of experience-memory 
and partly by external reinforcement, then it is only partly an experience-mem­
ory. This sounds exactly the same as the verdict on a C-type case, but there is a 
subtle difference. For in a D-type case the last stage in the causation of the mem­
ory-impression is normal. The abnormality occurs at the penultimate stage, where 
reinforcement is needed. This difference is expressible in the terminology of 
memory-traces: in a D-type case a weak memory-trace is strengthened, but in a 
C-type case its causal operation is supplemented by an independent contribution 
from another cause. 
Beneath the general effect of hypothesis D there is a difference which depends 
on whether the in.appropriate causation comes from an explicit verbal reminder 
or a sensory cue. Either way, there is outside help, and so the subject's ability to 
make correct experience-memory claims is not a self-sufficient disposition main­
tained by its own appropriate causation. The difference is that he discovers for 
himself that something is a sensory cue, and this discovery is an achievement of 
memory, whereas he does not have to discover for himself that what another per­
son says is a reminder when it is explicitly offered as such. This difference is not 
connected with the greater completeness of verbal reminders. It is true that they 
are nearly always more complete than sensory cues, which usually touch the orig­
inal experience at only one point; Consequently, the subject has less to do after 
he has understood a verbal reminder than after he has taken a sensory cue. But 
the difference to which I am drawing attention, concerns his cooperation at an 
earlier stage, before he understands the verbal reminder or takes the sensory cue. 
He does not have to discover how to interpret the former, but he does have to 
discover how to interpret the latter, and this discovery is itself an achievement of 
memory. 
'This needs an example to illustrat.e it. A man sitting at a cafe table sees a wo· 
man walk past but does not notice her. For immediately afterwards his compan­
ion asks him if he remembers seeing her, and he rep1ies that he does not. So there 
is as yet no evidence that he did see her. But later he sees another woman, who 
happens to look like the first one, and this woman's face strikes him as familiar. 
So he asks himself where he has seen a similar face recently, and this question re­
vives the experience-memory trace, and so elicits an experience-memory of seeing 
the first woman walk past the cafe table. But it is not wholly an experience-mem­
ory, because external help was needed. 
However, the man's achievement is more an achievemeiit of experience-mem­
ory than it would have been if his companion had reminded him of the first wo­
man's appearance, and the description had revived the original memory-trace. It 
is true that his memory is not operating unaided when he needs the help of a sen­
sory cue. But he himself notices that the second woman's face is familiar, and 
that is an achievement of memory. It is a further achievement of memory that he 
connects the second woman's appearance with something seen on the first occa-
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sion--a connection which would have been made for him by his companion if it 
had been a case of verbal reminding. 
This step-wise process is characteristic of the operation of sensory cues. Be­
cause they operate in this way, they do not undermine the self-sufficiency of 
the causation of experience-memory as much as verbal reminders undermine it. 
Of course, the undermining occurs only when the external reinforcement is 
needed. But it is part of hypothesis D that it is needed. 
The analysis of C-type and D-type cases has led to the theory of memory­
traces. The next step would be to offer a definition of "a memory-trace", as Mar­
tin and Deutsc.her do in their article.7 But nothing that I have said depends on 
the way in which the next step is taken. I introduced memory-traces simply as 
links in the normal causation of memory. This concept is indispensable if we are 
going to draw a distinction between the two ways in which the normal causation 
of a memory may be helped by deviant causation. For one way is through the 
strengthening of the normal causal links, and the other way is through the addi­
tion of an independent causal supplement. But a normal causal link is a memory­
trace. So the distinction cannot be drawn without making any use of the concept 
of a memory-trace. However1 this says nothing about the nature of memory­
traces. It characterizes them only by their function. 
I have made free use of the concept of "the appropriate causal route for ex­
perience-memory", illustrating it with examples, but never defining it. In fact, 
it cannot be defined wholly in terms of memory traces, whatever their nature. 
For, as Martin and Deutscher8 point out, the sequence of memory-traces lead­
ing to an experience-memory impression might contain an artificial stage, which 
would be a memory-aid in the sense in which we now have hearing-aids. For ex­
ample, a prosthetic device in the cortex might preserve a memory , or a set of 
memories, which would otherwise have perished. This raises a difficult question 
about the limits of the scope of the concept of this type of memory-aid. It would 
require another paper to deal with this question, and so, more generally, with the 
task of defining "the appropriate causal route for experience-memory." The de­
finition would probably be functional, as it is in the case of perception. 
1. Philosophical Review 1966. 
2.. Analysis 1966. 
3. Loe. cit. 
4. Treatise I. i. 3. 
5. Anatys1s of Mind Ch. IX. 
FOOTNOTES 
6. This case is discussed by J.L. Mackie in "The Cement of the Universe", 13. 44 ff. 
7. Loe. cit. 
8. Loe. cit. 
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